I. Introduction
The popularity, scope and competitiveness of online auctions have encouraged auctioneers to introduce various new schemes. Particularly noteworthy is the use of a buy price in English auctions where a seller announces a maximum price bid at which any bidder at any time can immediately win the auction. With this new phenomenon, several questions follow: Can the seller benefit from setting up a buy price? And if so, how does she determine the optimal buy price? Can the buyers benefit from attending auctions with buy prices and what are their optimal strategies? Is a buy-price English auction efficient? To examine these questions, we need a formal theoretical analysis.
This paper models the buy-price English auction where the buy price remains during the entire course of the auction. Such an auction, like that offered by Yahoo! and uBid, composes a hybrid sales model, allowing a fixed-price sale within an auction. eBay's buy-it-now feature, however, differs because it only allows a fixed-price sale before an auction -once there is a valid bid, i.e., a bid above or equal to the reserve, the buy-it-now option disappears 1 .
1 Although eBay's buy-it-now feature allows a seller to attract buyers from both the auction and posted-price sales markets with only one listing fee, its weaknesses outweighs such a benefit: (1) the seller does not enjoy the full benefit of a posted-price sale because it can be easily stopped by any valid bid; and (2) the seller reduces her expected profit from the auction because the auction becomes inefficient (Ausubel and Cramton 1999) , i.e., the highest bidder is no longer guaranteed to win: bidders have to decide whether or not to exercise buyWe prove that the revenue equivalence theorem holds when the seller and buyers are risk-neutral, that is, the seller's expected profit in a buy-price auction is the same as that in a traditional auction. But when either the seller, the buyers or both are riskaverse, the seller can gain higher expected profit in a buy-price English auction than a traditional one. A buyer, who is either risk-neutral or has a Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA) (Brennan 1979) utility, is indifferent between buy-price and traditional auctions. In addition, buy-price English auctions are efficient if the seller optimally sets the buy price high enough. Our calculation provides such a lower bound.
A buy price does not affect the strategy of a bidder whose valuation is lower than the buy price, i.e., his dominant strategy is to bid up to his valuation. But a bidder with a valuation above the buy price has three pure strategies. We prove that there exist valuations v andv, buy price < v ≤v, such that a bidder with a valuation abovev uses the buy price unconditionally (i.e., regardless there is competition or not), a bidder with a valuation between v andv uses the buy price on the condition that there already exists a valid bid (i.e., at least one competing bidder exists), and a bidder with a valuation between the buy price and v uses the buy price when the current high bid reaches a threshold price (i.e., competition among bidders has reached to a level that the bidder dare not to wait further).
it-now without observing any bid, and their best symmetric strategy is to find a valuation level above which they unconditionally exercise buy-it-now. Reynolds and Wooders (2002) provide a formal discussion on the inefficiency of eBay's buy-it-now option.
In addition to the three well-defined pure strategies that bidders with valuations above the buy price can easily follow, threshold bidders' equilibrium threshold prices also have nice properties: (1) They can be calculated using the buy price and the bidders' utility functions and value distribution; (2) They are above the reserve and strictly decreasing with valuations, i.e., the higher a threshold bidder's valuation is the lower his threshold price. This leads to the situation that when the buy price is set high enough so that there are only threshold bidders (i.e., no conditional or unconditional bidders), it guarantees that the highest bidder wins and, hence, the equilibrium yields full efficiency. (3) The more risk-averse a threshold bidder is, the lower is his threshold price. In other words, a more risk-averse bidder tends to use the buy price earlier. Therefore, the seller can gain higher expected profit with risk-averse buyers than with riskneutral buyers.
Since the use of buy prices in auctions only started in the year 2000, there is not much literature on these issues. Budish and Takeyama (2001) modeled two bidders with two-point value distribution and Reynolds and Wooders (2002) modeled two bidders with uniform value distribution. Our analysis is the most general one modeling n bidders with arbitrary continuous value distribution. Although Budish and Takeyama (2001) using simpler model concluded that with properly set buy price the seller facing risk-neutral buyers earns the same expected profit in a buy-price auction as in a traditional auction and the seller facing risk-averse buyers earns higher expected profit in a buy-price auction than in a traditional auction, our unique contribution to the literature is at least four-fold: (1) we introduce the general model which can be easily extended for further studies; (2) we clearly state and prove the bidders' strategies that are easy to follow; (3) we compare behaviors of bidders with different degree of risk aversion; and (4) we analyze the seller's risk aversion and its impact on the use of buy prices.
The remaining of the existing literature focused more on eBay's buy-it-now auctions. Reynolds and Wooders (2002) mainly focused on eBay's buy-it-now auctions and had an incomplete analysis of Yahoo! buy-price auctions. Mathews (2003) extensively studied eBay's buy-it-now auctions. Mathews (2002c) studied a two-stage game, a variation of eBay's model: Bidders can exercise buy prices at stage one and attend a traditional auction at stage two. Mathews (2002b) extended the two-stage game to allow multiple buy price stages followed by a conventional auction. All these papers did not study the hybrid sales model, which is of interest of this paper. Wang (1993) concludes that for a seller an auction is always better than a fixed-price sale when the auction is costless to the seller. We further prove that embedding a fixed-price sale in an auction is at least as good as a traditional auction for a seller if the buy price is properly set.
This paper proceeds as follows: In Section II, we introduce the model and characterize the buyers' pure strategy equilibrium and its properties. In Section III, we prove that the seller is not worse off using buy prices. Section IV concludes the paper.
II. Bidder Equilibrium Strategy

A. The Model
This study assumes that there is one seller and n bidders in a buy-price English auction of an indivisible good, only bids above or equal to the reserve price are accepted, and the seller has committed not to relist her item if she receives no valid bid. The no-resale constraint is a standard assumption and is naturally satisfied in cases of perishable or time sensitive goods like flowers or tickets. We also assume that bidders have independent private valuations drawn randomly from the same cumulative probability distribution F , which is strictly increasing and differentiable over its support [m, M ] 2 . Let f = F denote the probability density. The private-value assumption is restrictive, but auctions selling unique collectibles or used goods without established market values come close to private-value auctions.
To simplify the analysis, we use a modified "English Thermometer Auction" where a price ticker starting at the reserve price increases continuously and each bidder controls two buttons: "bid" and "buy." At the start, each bidder willing to pay at least the reserve price presses and holds down the "bid" button. Once a bidder releases the "bid" button, he no longer can return to the auction. At any time, any active bidder can press the "buy" button, i.e., bid at the buy price, to immediately win and close the auction. When more than one bidder presses his "buy" buttons simultaneously, the winner will be chosen randomly among them. During the auction, bidders do not know how many bidders remain active. If no bidder presses the "buy" button, the auction ends when either only one bidder is left holding the "bid" button or the price ticker reaches the buy price. In the former case, the last bidder wins and pays the ticker price (the price where the second highest bidder drops out), whereas, in the latter case, the winner is chosen randomly among the remaining bidders.
B. Bidders' Equilibrium Threshold Strategies
The pure and dominant strategy for a bidder with a valuation below the buy price, like in a conventional English auction, is to bid up to his valuation.
The strategy space for a bidder with a valuation above the buy price is more complicated. When there are multiple bidders with valuations above the buy price, the winner will be the one who first commits to the buy price. If such a bidder knows that there exists at least one bidder with a valuation above the buy price, he would find the appropriate moment to press the "buy" button before any other bidder uses the buy price. If he guesses that no other bidder has valuation above the buy price, he should simply keep bidding. Since there is no dominant strategy for such a bidder, the best we can search for is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Let r denote the reserve price, b the buy price. A bidder with a valuation v, v > b, has three pure strategies from which to choose:
• Unconditional: Bid immediately at the buy price;
• Conditional: Bid but use the buy price immediately if someone else submits a bid above or equal to the reserve;
• Threshold: Keep bidding until winning or a threshold price t > r is reached. Once t is reached, bid immediately at the buy price.
We will prove that the bidders' equilibrium strategies (see Figure Note that the conditional and unconditional strategies can be viewed as special cases of the threshold strategy where the threshold price is equal to the reserve price and zero respectively. The dominant strategy can be regarded as having a threshold price equal to b, i.e., such a bidder never jumps to the buy price. To simply the notations in the following proofs, we as-
Next we obtain the necessary and sufficient conditions for t, v andv to determine a symmetric Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. We first calculate bidders' expected profit under different strategies. We then establish two propositions regarding t, compute t, and prove t indeed corresponds to a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. Furthermore, we prove the existence of unique v andv and show how to compute them.
Let u(x) denote the bidder's von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, where x is the difference between the buyer's valuation and his payment if he wins and is zero if otherwise. Let s(p) denote the seller's utility when she sells the item and receives the payment p. Both functions, we assume, are concave, twice continuously differentiable and strictly increasing. We allow u and s to be linear, representing the utility of risk-neutral buyers and seller. Let v s be the seller's valuation for the good, assuming u(0) = s(v s ) = 0 and u (0) = s (v s ) = 1. Since we are concerned of strategies for a bidder with v > b, let us calculate such a bidder's expected profit under the different strategies:
Unconditional strategy:
A bidder using the unconditional strategy only competes with bidders using the same strategy. The probability that a bidder uses the unconditional strategy is 1 − F (v) and the probability that there are exactly k − 1 other bidders (1 ≤ k ≤ n) who also use the unconditional strategy is
Conditional strategy:
A bidder using the conditional strategy wins if there are no unconditional bidders and he is chosen randomly among the conditional bidders. A conditional bidder pays b if there is a valid bid and pays r if there is no valid bids. We calculate his expected profit Π c (v) by adding his extra profit when he pays only r to his expected profit if assuming he always pays b:
Threshold strategy:
A bidder with a threshold price p wins and pays b if there are no unconditional and conditional bidders and the current highest bid reaches p or wins and pays max{2nd highest bid, r} if all other bidders have valuations below p. Let G n−1 (p) be the probability that a bidder with a threshold price p exercises the buy price and wins the auction. We will show later how to cal-
We now establish two properties of t.
PROOF. See Appendix A.
PROOF. See Appendix B.
In the interest of simplicity, we assume for the remainder of the paper that t is continuously differentiable in both variables so long as it is above r.
Using the above two propositions we can show the following theorem.
THEOREM 1: Any threshold price function t(v, b) corresponding to an equilibrium satisfies the following differential equation:
This is an ordinary differential equation for t(·, b) with the boundary condition t(b, b) = b. The equation always has a unique solution of t(v, b). Although we cannot express the general solution explicitly, bidders in practice can apply (4) to calculate their optimal threshold prices once the characteristics of an auction market (e.g., bidders' value distribution, utility functions and the seller's buy price) become known. We will soon demonstrate the use of (4) when a bidder has a CARA utility.
This further verifies Proposition 1 that t is strictly decreasing in v when b < v < v. Now we prove that the threshold function defined by (4) is the best response threshold value. PROOF. To show that t(v, b) = p * maximizes the expected profit of a bidder with b < v < v, it is enough to show that ∂Πt(v,p) ∂p is positive if p < t(v, b) and negative when p > t (v, b) . From the detailed proof in Appendix D, we get Π t (v, p) strictly increasing for all p ∈ (r, t(v, b)) and strictly decreasing for p ∈ (t(v, b), b). This proves that, as long as all other bidders use the threshold strategy, p * = t(v, b) maximizes Π t (v, p) for a given v, b < v < v; that is, the optimal threshold price of a bidder with valuation v is t(v, b). PROOF. Proposition 3 with v = M shows that a bidder cannot improve his profit by using a different threshold strategy. We still need to show that he cannot improve his profit by switching to the conditional or unconditional strategies, and for this it is sufficient to show that
The right side above is the bidder's maximum possible profit if using the conditional strategy: a conditional bidder reaches his maximum possible expected profit when he pays r if everyone else has a valuation below r and pays b otherwise. It is higher than the maximum profit possible using the unconditional strategy, which is u(v − b). When all other bidders follow the threshold strategy, by Proposition 3, we have
and using (3) and PROOF. By Corollary 1, all bidders follow the threshold strategy with a threshold strictly decreasing with the valuation, which means the the highest bidder will reach his threshold first, thus the highest bidder will win the auction. This, by the revenue equivalence theorem by Myerson (1981) and Riley and Samuelson (1981) implies that the buy-price auction yields the same expected revenues to both the buyers and the seller as the traditional English auction.
When lim v→M t(v, b) < r, there is no equilibrium where everyone uses a threshold strategy, but the following theorem holds: We can calculate the equilibriumv and v using (1) and (2). First, find the equation that givesv for a given v.
Either
For a given v, the right-hand-side above is strictly decreasing in v, while the left-hand-side is strictly increasing. Therefore, there is either one uniquev solution,v > v, or nov > v solution, which in turn implies one of the following must hold:
M and all bidders with valuation over v prefer the conditional strategy. Or,
which takes place when Π u (v) ≥ Π c (v) for all v ≥ v; thus,v = v and all bidders with valuation over v prefer the unconditional strategy.
v is the valuation limit where bidders switch from the threshold strategy either to the conditional or unconditional strategies; thus, Π t (v, t(v, b)) = Π d (v). Since both sides are continuous, in order to demonstrate that there is a solution to this equation, it is sufficient to show that Π t (v, t(v, b) 
Letṽ satisfy t(ṽ, b) = r. Note thatṽ < M exists here because lim v→M t(v, b) < r. We have
To show that t, v andv correspond to an equilibrium, we will need the following proposition:
PROPOSITION 4: For all v > b and r < p < b,
This means that for all p,
which implies that bidders with valuation below v cannot improve their expected utility by switching to the conditional or unconditional strategies. For any v > v and for any p,
which implies that bidders with valuation above v following the better of conditional and unconditional strategies cannot gain by switching to a threshold strategy. Proposition 4 also implies that v,v) bidders prefer the conditional strategy and, for all v >v, bidders prefer the unconditional strategy. If there is nov that satisfies Π u (v) = Π c (v), then either (6) or (7) holds, i.e., one of the two strategies is always strictly better than the other. Now we have shown that t, v andv indeed determine an equilibrium.
We can prove that v andv are unique and the equilibrium described in theorem 2 is the only pure strategy symmetric equilibrium of a buy-price English auction. The proof is not difficult and uses similar techniques as does the proof of theorem 2. Since the proof does not provide any more economical insights, we choose to omit it in this paper.
C. Threshold Prices and the Absolute Level of Risk Aversion
Now we examine the relationship between a bidder's threshold price and his absolute level of risk aversion. Assuming that the bidder's valuation unchanged, the following theorem proves that the more risk-averse a bidder is, the lower is his threshold price. In other words, the more risk-averse a bidder is, the sooner would he use the buy price in order to avoid the risk that someone else may use it before him. THEOREM 3: Let u 1 , u 2 be concave or linear utility functions, t 1 , t 2 be the corresponding threshold-price functions, and a 1 = −u 1 /u 1 , a 2 = −u 2 /u 2 be the absolute level of risk aversion.
PROOF. Prove by contradiction: assume that for all x ≥ 0,
α exists because the set over which we take the maximum is closed, bounded from above, and non-empty (e.g., includes b). Then for all v, α < v ≤ β, t 1 (v, b) < t 2 (v, b).
Using Lemma F1 from Appendix F, the following inequalities hold:
This, combined with equation (4), implies When a bidder needs to choose between a buy-price and traditional English auction, which one should he prefer? To decide, we need to compare his expected profits. For a bidder with a valuation below or equal to b, the two auctions are equivalent because his equilibrium strategy remains the same. For a bidder with valuation above b, he follows the same strategy as in the traditional auction as long as the second highest bidder's valuation is below the threshold price. But if the second highest bidder's valuation is x > t(v, b), then his expected extra gain from attending a buy-price auction, instead of a traditional one, is
Next, we calculate the bidder's gains when he is risk-averse or risk-neutral, respectively. Suppose the bidder has CARA utility u a (x) = (1 − e −ax )/a, where a > 0 is the absolute level of risk aversion. If the bidder is risk-neutral, a = 0, u 0 (x) = lim a→0 u a (x) = x. Subsequently whenever we mention CARA utilities we also include the linear utility function. The CARA utilities satisfy the following
Applying them in (4), we get
Solving it with the boundary condition t(b, b) = b yields
Using equation (9), a bidder with CARA utility can calculate his threshold price t(v, b). Rewriting (8) and using (9), we get
Hence, a bidder with CARA utility and a valuation b < v < v gains zero expected profit from attending a buy-price auction rather than a traditional one. Combining this with our earlier discussion of bidders with v ≤ b and v ≥ v, we reach the conclusion that regardless of his valuation and risk preference, a bidder with CARA utility is indifferent between buy-price and traditional English auctions.
III. Seller's Gains from Using Buy Prices
A. Risk-neutral Sellers
Define t M = lim v→M t(v, b). We have seen that when t M ≥ r, in equilibrium, all bidders follow the threshold strategy with a strictly decreasing t, ensuring that the highest bidder win. The revenue equivalence theorem, which is true only when both the seller and the bidders are risk-neutral, implies that a risk-neutral seller's expected profit in a buy-price auction is the same as that in a traditional auction. On the other hand, when t M ≥ r does not hold, bidders with valuations above v follow different strategies that no longer guarantee the highest bidder win. When bidders have CARA utility and t M ≥ r, we can derive the following from equation (9) 
which implies (10)
When buyers are risk-neutral, i.e., a = 0 and u a (b − x) = b − x, the condition of (10) is equivalent to
which can be rewritten as
Inequality (11) is important because it helps the seller to choose appropriate buy prices. In order to obtain an expected profit at least equivalent to that of a traditional auction, the seller should choose a buy price at least as high as the expected value of the maximum valuation among (n − 1) bidders, on the condition that at least one of those bidders has a valuation above or equal to the reserve. For example, when the bidders are riskneutral and have a uniform [0, 1] distribution, and the seller's valuation is 0, the optimal reserve price is 0.5. If there are two bidders, then the lowest buy price that still results in a revenue equivalent to that of a traditional auction is 0.75. As the number of bidders increases, the buy price should also increase in order to ensure the revenue equivalence.
We can conclude our findings on risk-neutral sellers in the following theorems: PROOF. Theorem 4 says that a risk-neutral seller gains no extra expected profit with risk-neutral buyers in a buy-price auction.
Theorem 3 says that the more risk-averse buyers are, the lower their threshold prices. This increases the seller's expected profit because more buyers will pay the buy price instead of the second highest bidder valuation. But in a traditional auction, the seller's expected profit does not change with the buyer's level of risk aversion, as buyers bid up to their valuations regardless. Therefore, when buyers are risk-averse, a risk-neutral seller is better off in a buy-price auction.
B. Risk-averse Sellers
Let us now calculate the expected profit of a risk-averse seller with risk-neutral buyers. The calculation presented below is similar to that of Riley and Samuelson (1981) except that the seller's utility function s(x), where x denote the sale price, is more general because the seller under analysis can be either risk-neutral or risk-averse: s(x) = x if the seller is risk-neutral and s(x) is strictly concave if the seller is risk-averse.
At the equilibrium, the seller's expected profit from a bidder with a valuation below b is the same as in a traditional auction. It is given by the equation (8b) in Riley and Samuelson (1981) :
Assuming that lim v→M t(v, b) ≥ r, i.e., v = M . The seller's expected profit from a bidder with a valuation v > b is:
Hence, the seller's overall expected profit from all n bidders, denoted by Π s (v, b), is:
Since we can regard no buy price in a traditional auction as have a b, b → ∞, to prove that a risk-averse seller is better off in a buy-price auction with risk-neutral buyers is equivalent to show-
Differentiating (9) by b with a = 0, i.e., u a (x) = x, we get:
Applying (13) and s(b)−s(t) ≥ s (b)(b−t) due to the concavity of s, we get
The inequality shows that as long as (11) holds, i.e., the buy price is set high enough that no one uses a conditional or unconditional strategy, a risk-averse seller is strictly better off in a buy-price auction than in a traditional auction. The equality holds if and only if the seller is risk-neutral, implying that the seller's expected profits from a buy-price is the same as in a traditional auction. Moreover, risk-averse buyers even further increase the seller's expected profit in a buy-price auction. Hence, the following theorem holds:
THEOREM 6: In a buy-price English auction, if either the seller or the buyers are risk-averse and the buy price is at least as high as the expected value of the maximum valuation among (n − 1) buyers on the condition that at least one of the (n − 1) buyers has a valuation above or equal to the reserve, the seller's expected profit is higher than that in a traditional auction.
Therefore, we can conclude that regardless of whether the seller is risk-neutral or risk-averse, he cannot lose by using buy prices in English auctions.
IV. Concluding Remarks
This paper analyzes buy-price English auctions of an indivisible good with the general setting of n bidders with continuous, independently distributed private valuations. We prove that if the seller and bidders are risk-neutral, buy prices would not affect the auction outcome. The revenue equivalence theorem still applies and the auction is efficient. If the seller is risk-averse, or if the seller is risk-neutral but the bidders are risk-averse, a buy-price English auction can actually provide the seller higher expected profit than can a traditional English auction. Auctioneers can conduct market research on the players' degree of risk aversion in different markets and recommend buy-price options to auction sellers.
Our paper shows that buy-price auctions offered by Yahoo! and uBid are, in theory, more beneficial to both sellers and buyers than the "buy-it-now" auctions offered by eBay, especially for unique and used items where buyers have private valuations and face relatively high risk. While the positive network externality has contributed significantly to the popularity of eBay, features in Yahoo! and uBid auctions also have their own competitive advantages. 3 An extension of this model would consider the time factor. With the pace of transactions getting faster and the Internet's around-the-clock operations allowing random arrival of traders, the temporal property of a trade becomes increasingly important. We suspect that time-averse auction sellers and buyers are more likely to use buy prices and the shortened auction cycles increase the market liquidity. Mathews (2002a) modeled eBay's buyit-now auction with a time discount and showed that the seller would use a buy price that will be exercised with positive probability because even when the seller and buyers are risk-neutral buyers are willing to pay more to get the item sooner and/or the seller is willing to give up some of his expected profit to get the payment sooner. In contrast to their eBay model with uniform bidder distribution, a more general model would be in need to analyze Yahoo!-like buy-price auctions with arbitrary bidder distribution.
Another research direction is to study how the seller uses buy prices as signaling devices. Too high a buy price may alienate buyers from bidding. Too low a buy price may convey information on adverse quality. It might even be possible to embed a Dutch auction within an English auction by allowing decreasing buy prices.
Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 1
Since we assume F is strictly increasing, every bidder would have a unique valuation and there will not be randomdraw cases. When the auction ticker reaches t 0 , a bidder with a valuation v 1 can either jump to the buy price immediately for a guaranteed u(v 1 −b) profit, or continue bidding and wait to jump at t 1 . Since by our assumption t 1 is this bidder's equilibrium threshold price, jumping at t 1 should give him expected profit no less than jumping at t 0 :
On the other hand, for the buyer with valuation v 0 , jumping to the buy price at t 0 is at least as good as continuing bidding and jumping at t 1 :
G n−1 (t) is defined to be the probability that a bidder with threshold t exercises the buy price and wins the auction. Lowering the threshold from t 1 to t 0 increases the chance of successfully using the buy price by at least the probability that there is another bidder with valuation between t 0 and t 1 , i.e.,
, and (A2) becomes
which implies F (t 0 ) = F (t 1 ). Since F is strictly increasing, t 0 = t 1 must hold, contradictory to our assumption. Therefore, we have proved that t(v, b) is non-increasing in v for all v ≥ b. Now we further prove that t(v, b) is strictly decreasing when b < v < v, i.e., t(v, b) > r. Again, prove by contradiction. Assume that for t 0 > r and some
e., all bidders with valuations between v 0 and v 1 pool at the same threshold price t 0 . This implies a positive probability that more than one bidder with valuations between v 0 and v 1 would jump to the buy price simultaneously when t 0 is reached and the winner would be chosen randomly among them. But if one of them decides to jump earlier, i.e., when the ticker reaches t 0 − ε instead of t 0 for some arbitrarily small ε, he can avoid this random-draw gamble and increase his chance of winning. Doing so, he can increase his expected profit and only suffer at most ε additional loss. Clearly, if ε is small enough, he can be better off by jumping earlier. Therefore, pooling cannot be an equilibrium. Thus, t(v, b) is strictly decreasing when b < v < v, i.e., t(v, b) > r.
If t 0 > t + , the integral on the right side would be strictly positive. Therefore, the above formula can only hold if t + = t 0 . This completes the proof of the right-continuity of t(v, b) with regard to v when t(v, b) > r. Using similar arguments, we can prove the left-continuity of t.
Note that the continuity of t(v, b) in v is only true when t(v, b) > r; it is possible that t has discontinuity at some point where t suddenly drops to r. 
In equilibrium, when all other bidders follow the threshold strategy determined by t, the optimal threshold price of a bidder with valuation
Because t(v, b) is strictly decreasing and continuous in v when b < v < v, its inverse function in the first variable, denoted by w(·, b), exists:
Using w, T (p) can be expressed as
and we have
Replacing T (p) and T (p) in G n−1 (p), we get
Therefore, we have
Dividing by u(v − b)F n−1 (p) > 0 preserves the sign of the above formula, and we get
When t is the equilibrium threshold function, i.e., p * = t(v, b) and w(p * , b) = v, the above is zero:
And clearly, t(b, b) = b, since a bidder with valuation b cannot get any surplus by bidding the buy price.
Appendix D. Proof of Proposition 3
For the proof we will need the following lemma:
PROOF. Let x < y. First consider the case when p is in the range of t, i.e., v = w(p, b) < v and t(w(p, b), b) = p. Substitute v = w(p, b) into (4):
Substituting this into (C2) we get , p < t(v, b) , and negative if w(p, b) < v, i.e., p > t (v, b) . This shows that t(v, b) maximizes the expected profit from the threshold strategy as long as the threshold is in the range of t. Since t is continuously decreasing and t(b, b) = b, the range of
When p is not in the range of t, i.e., r < p ≤ t and no other bidder will use a threshold price below or equal to p, using the threshold price p, a bidder can only lose to conditional or unconditional bidders. Therefore,
Applying it in (C1) we get
which implies that Π t (v, p) is strictly increasing for all p ∈ (r, t].
Combining this with the case in which p ∈ [t, b), we get Π t (v, p) strictly increasing for all p ∈ (r, t(v, b)) and strictly decreasing for p ∈ (t(v, b), b). This proves that, as long as all other bidders use the threshold strategy, p * = t(v, b) maximizes Π t (v, p) for a given v; that is, the optimal threshold price of a bidder with valuation v is t(v, b).
Appendix E. Proof of Proposition 4
PROPOSITION 4 For all v > b and r < p < b,
Since u is concave, u (v − r) ≤ u (v − b). So we have (u (v − r) − u (v − b))F n−1 (r) ≤ 0. Together with F (v) ≤ 1, we get Π u (v) ≥ Π c (v).
A threshold bidder wins only if there are no unconditional or conditional bidders. Therefore, his probability of winning is at most F n−1 (v). A bidder with a threshold price p wins if either all other bidders have valuations below p, which has a probability F n−1 (p), or he successfully exercises the buy price, which has a probability G n−1 (p). This implies
, for all x ≤ b, with the above inequality, we get
The average of (E1) over k = 0, . . . , n − 1 is exactly Π c (v), which leads to
Appendix F. Comparing utility functions based on the level of risk-aversion LEMMA F1: Let u 1 : R + → R + , u 2 : R + → R + be twice differentiable utility functions, u 1 (0) = u 2 (0) = 0, and u 1 (x) > 0, u 2 (x) > 0 for all x ≥ 0. Let a 1 = −u 1 /u 1 and a 2 = −u 2 /u 2 be the absolute level of risk aversion. If a 1 (x) ≤ a 2 (x) for all x ≥ 0, then the following inequality holds:
When ∃y (0 < y < x) such that the equality holds, there is a constant λ such that u 1 (z) = λu 2 (z) for all 0 ≤ z ≤ x.
PROOF. Let λ = u 1 (x)/u 2 (x). Part I: We want to prove that ∀x, y, 0 < y < x u 1 (x) u 2 (x) ≥ u 1 (y) u 2 (y) ⇐⇒ λ ≥ u 1 (y) u 2 (y) ⇐⇒ λu 2 (y) − u 1 (y) ≥ 0
Prove by contradiction: Suppose ∃y 0 < y < x ∧ λu 2 (y) − u 1 (y) < 0 , that is, ∃y 0 < y < x ∧ y 0 (λu 2 (v)−u 1 (v)) dv < 0 . Together with u 1 (0) = u 2 (0) = 0, it implies that there is a z, 0 < z < y, s.t., λu 2 (z) − u 1 (z) < 0, that is, u 1 (z)/u 2 (z) > λ.
Note that a 1 = −u 1 /u 1 = (− ln u 1 ) and a 2 = −u 2 /u 2 = (− ln u 2 ) . Thus for all v ≥ 0:
This means that u 1 /u 2 is non-decreasing. Therefore, ∀v v ≥ z =⇒ u 1 (v)/u 2 (v) > λ =⇒ λu 2 (v) − u 1 (v) < 0 . Hence λu 2 (x)−u 1 (x) = λu 2 (y)−u 1 (y)+ x y (λu 2 (v)−u 1 (v)) dv < 0 which contradicts to the definition of λ = u 1 (x)/u 2 (x). Therefore, the following must hold:
∀x, y 0 < y < x =⇒ u 1 (x) u 1 (y) ≥ u 2 (x) u 2 (y)
Part II: Assume ∃y 0 < y < x ∧ λu 2 (y) − u 1 (y) = 0 , that is y 0 (λu 2 (v) − u 1 (v)) dv = 0
Note that u 1 /u 2 is non-decreasing. In order to satisfy the above, either ∀z 0 < z < y =⇒ λu 2 (z) − u 1 (z) = 0 or ∃z 1 , z 2 0 < z 1 < z 2 < y ∧ λu 2 (z 1 )−u 1 (z 1 ) > 0 ∧ λu 2 (z 2 )−u 1 (z 2 ) < 0 . But the later case means that ∀v(z 2 ≤ v ≤ x =⇒ λu 2 (v) − u 1 (v) < 0), thus λu 2 (x)−u 1 (x) = λu 2 (y)−u 1 (y)+ x y (λu 2 (v)−u 1 (v)) dv < 0 which contradicts to the definition of λ = u 1 (x)/u 2 (x). Thus the earlier case ∀z 0 < z < y =⇒ λu 2 (z) − u 1 (z) = 0 must be true. Consequently, together with u 1 (0) = u 2 (0) = 0, we get ∀z 0 < z < y =⇒ λu 2 (z) − u 1 (z) = 0 . For ∀z, y < z < x, applying the inequality result in Part I, we have u 1 (z) u 1 (y) ≥ u 2 (z) u 2 (y) = λu 2 (z) λu 2 (y)
Also, Part I says that ∀z 0 < z < x =⇒ λu 2 (z)−u 1 (z) ≥ 0 . Therefore, ∀z y < z < x, =⇒ λu 2 (z)−u 1 (z) = 0 , therefore ∀z 0 < z < x =⇒ λ = u 1 (z)/u 2 (z) .
